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In-flight Spatial Disorientation Induces Roll Reversal Errors when Using
the Attitude Indicator
Abstract
We hypothesized that an incorrect expectation due to spatial disorientation may
induce roll reversal errors. To test this, an in-flight experiment was performed, in
which forty non-pilots rolled wings level after receiving motion cues. A No-leans
condition (subthreshold motion to a bank angle) was included, as well as a Leans-
opposite condition (leans cues, opposite to the bank angle) and a Leans-level
condition (leans cues, but level flight).
The presence of leans cues led to an increase of the roll reversal error
(RRE) rate by a factor of 2.6. There was no significant difference between the
Leans-opposite and Leans-level condition. This suggests that the expectation
strongly affects the occurrence of an RRE, and that people tend to base their
responses on motion cues instead of on information on the AI.
We conclude that expectation and spatial disorientation have a large effect
on piloting errors and may cause hazardous aircraft upsets.
Keywords: Aviation, Displays, Spatial disorientation, Surprise, Upset recovery

1. Introduction
In previous research, pilots were found to sometimes make ‘roll reversal errors’
(RREs) when referencing the attitude indicator (AI), which is also known as the
artificial horizon (Beringer, Williges & Roscoe, 1975; Hasbrook & Rasmussen,
1973; Müller et al., 2018; Singer & Dekker, 2002). These RREs, which are roll
inputs towards the opposite of the required side, are thought to be facilitated by
an ambiguity of the presented bank angle on the generally used moving-horizon
type AI (see, Figure 1; Roscoe, 2004; Previc & Ercoline, 1999;Wickens, 2003). This
ambiguity may cause interpretation errors known as ‘horizon control reversals’,
in which case the aircraft symbol and the horizon symbol are being confused
(Johnson & Roscoe, 1972). The AI in Figure 1, for instance, would then be
incorrectly interpreted as indicating a bank to the left instead of to the right.
Previous simulator-based and in-flight studies showed that pilots (1.5-3% RREs)
as well as non-pilots (ca. 20% RREs) are susceptible to RREs when they suddenly
had to respond to a AI that was shown (Bauerschmidt & Roscoe 1960; Beringer,
Williges, Roscoe, 1975; Hasbrook & Rasmussen, 1973; Ince, Williges, Roscoe,
1975; Muller et al., 2018; Roscoe & Williges, 1975; Singer & Dekker, 2008).
However, these studies did not account for the potential presence of an incorrect
expectation with regard to the bank angle when viewing the AI.
Units and symbols: s = seconds, Hz = Hertz, ° = arc degrees, SD = standard
deviation
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Figure 1. An example of a moving-horizon type AI, as used in this study, displaying a
bank to the right.
Insight into the effect of expectation on RREs is because incorrect
expectations may arise in flight due to spatial disorientation. Spatial
disorientation involves an erroneous sense of the aircraft attitude and motion
relative to the earth, which is caused by misleading vestibular and other motion
cues (Gillingham, 1992). It occurs most often in poor visibility conditions, when
reading the instruments correctly is most crucial. Spatial disorientation continues
to be a serious safety risk, as it was estimated to have contributed to 12 % of loss
of control accidents in transport and commuter aircraft, and 24 % of fatalities
between 1996 and 2010 (Belcastro et al., 2017). The most prevalent form of
spatial disorientation in aviation is the ‘leans’ illusion (Holmes et al., 2003;
Navanthe & Singh, 1994). This is caused by the vestibular system being insensitive
to low roll accelerations, leading to an incorrect sensation of the bank angle. The
leans has been a suspected factor in, for example, the accident of Flash Airlines
flight 604 (Bureau d’Enquêtes et d’Analyses pour la Sécurité de l’Aviation Civile
[BEA], 2009), which occurred shortly following takeoff at night. The first officer
alerted the captain of the gradual, unintended turn from left to right, upon which
the captain expressed surprise. The captain (pilot flying) followedwith a roll input
that caused an increase in the bank angle, which led to an overbank and loss of
control. Other accidents where leans was suspected to have caused an RRE were
Kenya Airways flight 5Y-KYA (Cameroon Civil Aviation Authority, 2010) and
Crossair flight 498 (Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau, 2002).
It can be hypothesized that misinterpretations and RREs are more likely to
occur when the controller has an incorrect expectation about the bank angle due
to the leans. Expectation is an important factor in the interpretation of ambiguous
information (Maloney & Zhang, 2010). In the current in-flight experiment, we
investigate if there is an effect of expectation, induced by leans cues, on the
occurrence of RREs. Several test conditions will be included to investigate if the
expectation causes misinterpretations of the AI.
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2. Material and methods
2.1 Participants
Forty non-pilot participants were invited from the Aerospace Engineering faculty
of Cranfield University (34 men, 6 women, mean age = 25.1 years, SD = 3.7).
Participants reported no vestibular issues, had (corrected to) normal vision, and
reported being well rested. Twenty-three participants had previously controlled
an aircraft on one or two occasions, while one was in flight training (ca. 20 hours).
Participants rated their simulated flying experience on average at 1.93 points,
median = 1, SD = 1.29, on a 1-5 points Likert-type scale ranging from ‘none or very
little’ (1) to ‘very much’ (5). The experiment was approved by the research ethics
review board of the university and participants provided informed consent prior
to participating.
2.2 Apparatus
The experiment took place in a light propeller aircraft (Scottish Aviation Bulldog
122). Participants used a centerstick and had the AI (Figure 1) available in front
of them (see, Figure 2). Test runs prior to the experiment confirmed that when
looking at the AI, it would be very difficult to notice that the outside horizon has
an angle of 10°. This is because the outside view is relatively bright compared to
the instrument panel, whichwould require adjusting the eyes. Also, the front view
is largely obstructed by the instrument panel.
Roll rate of the aircraft was logged at 100Hz using an inertialmeasurement
unit (IMU; Shimmersensing, Dublin, 500°/s setting) attached to the top of the
instrument panel in front of the participant. Roll rates were corrected by
subtracting the mean roll rate of the whole flight. The stick inputs were filmed
using a GoproTM camera, placed above and behind the seats, facing the
participant’s center stick and the instrument panel (See Figure 2 for a screenshot).
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Figure 2. A screenshot of the video recording. Left is the participant with the AI (a)
the centerstick (b) and the IMU (c) visible, right is the experimenter pilot.
2.3 Procedure and test conditions
After filling in a questionnaire and receiving a briefing, the participant was seated
in the left hand seat of the aircraft and the experimenter pilot flew to the test area.
The participant was then familiarized with the controls for approximately three
minutes by flying left and right turns and leveling the aircraft from bank angles
using the AI. Then, the participant performed a number of test conditions, with
one run per condition. This run started with the participant putting on a blindfold.
The pilot then flew a maneuver to induce a specific motion cue (see below).
Immediately after, the participant was asked to take the stick with their dominant
hand and, after a countdown from three, remove the blindfold and roll the wings
level using the AI. The runs took place at an altitude with minimal turbulence and
with the sun from behind. Tests were planned on days when the pilot judged the
weather calm enough for minimal turbulence.
The maneuvers flown in each condition are listed in Figure 3. First, a
number of practice runs (at least four, mean = 4.7, SD = 1.08) was flown until the
pilot considered the participant’s performance to be adequate. In the practice
runs, the cues were aimed to set up an expectation that matched the AI (the
Matching condition). For the analysis of performance in this condition, the results
of the third and fourth practice runwere used. More practice runswere performed
if the pilot deemed performance inadequate. The practice session ended with a
run in which the pilot waited 30 s before presenting the motion cue, to make this
matching run similar to the subsequent test runs.
Three test runs followed, one for each test condition (No-leans, Leans-
opposite and Leans-level, see Figure 3). In the No-leans condition, the aircraft was
rolled to 10° bank slowly (at circa 0.3°/s and .01 Hz, which is below the 4.0°/s
perception threshold; Gundry, 1978), while flying in a coordinated turn. The
intended expectation here was no bank. In the Leans-opposite condition, the
aircraft was rolled similarly slowly to 20° bank, and then quickly back (at circa 5.0
°/s and .25 Hz) to 10° bank on the same side. The intended expectation here was
a bank angle opposite to the actual bank angle. In the Leans-level condition, the
aircraft was rolled slowly to 20° bank, and then quickly back to level. The intended
expectation here was a bank angle, whereas the AI showed level flight. The
direction of the fast roll in the test conditions was always the same within each
participant, and it was counterbalanced between participants. Two variations of
condition sequence were used. The first half of participants followed sequence A
(1-2-3-4) and the second half sequence B (1-4-3-2). The numbers here indicate
the conditions as numbered in Figure 3.
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The experimenter pilot observed the participant’s first roll input and registered
its direction on a log sheet. An error was registered if the first input caused the
aircraft to roll away from level. This error would be an RRE in the Matching, No-
leans or Leans-opposite condition, and an undesired input (not an RRE) in the
Leans-level condition. The data on the log sheet were checked post-flight by an
experimenter using video data, or, if video was not available, with IMU data. The
agreement between both observations was high (98.1%). In case of disagreement
the video analysis took precedence.
2.4.2 Error duration
Video analysis was used to determine the start of the participant’s first input, and
the moment the participant started to move the stick back in the opposite
direction again. The time between these moments was defined as the duration of
an error. This definitionwas chosen instead of, for instance, the time until reaching




The reaction time was defined as the time from removal of the blindfold until the
start of the first input. These were both measured with video analysis. This was
reported separately for correct and incorrect inputs.
2.4.4 Learning effect
To check whether there was a training or surprise effect on the occurrence of
errors, the predictive effect of the sequence (A or B, Figure 3) on the occurrence
of an error and the error duration was determined. If participants learned to
anticipate the mismatching AI presentations, they may perform better in later
runs.
2.4.5 Subjective measures
Participants who performed the No-leans condition last (n = 20) provided verbal
feedback of their sensation of the bank angle (left, right or none) before the pilot
started the countdown for the response. This was not done for participants
performing the No-leans condition first, so as not to make them conscious of the
goal of the experiment.
2.4.6 Run similarity check
We measured two parameters to test if the runs in each condition were similarly
set up. The duration participants were blindfoldedwasmeasured. The duration of
the fast roll cue in the Leans-opposite and Leans-level condition was defined as
the time the roll rate exceeded 1.0°/s (as measured with the IMU).
2.5 Hypotheses
We expected error rates in our No-leans condition to be similar to previous in-
flight studies with non-pilot participants (i.e., around 20%). Error rates in the
mismatching conditions (Leans-opposite and Leans-level) were expected to be
higher than in the No-leans condition, as the misleadingmotion cues are expected
to cause additional errors. Since the Leans-opposite condition allows for
additional interpretation errors (horizon control reversals), most errors were
expected in the Leans-opposite condition.
Concerning error duration, we expected that interpretation errors take
longer to overcome than merely incorrect initial inputs. Therefore, the error
durations were expected to be shorter in the Leans-level condition than in the
Leans-opposite and No-leans conditions.
Concerning reaction times, the reaction times in RREs were expected to be
shorter than those of correct inputs, because really looking before responding
would likely lead to preventing an RRE. However, in the No-leans conditions,
participants would be more likely to look longer at the AI in any case, because
there should be no motion cues here to prompt a response.
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2.6 Data analysis
Results of the Matching condition (practice) are reported, but they are not used
for any comparisons with the test conditions. The error rates in the three test
conditions were analyzed using Chochran’s Q for main effects. Post-hoc
comparisons between all conditions were performed using McNemar with Holm-
Bonferroni correction. The effects of Condition on error duration as well as
reaction timewas tested using repeated-measures ANOVAs and post-hoc pairwise
t-tests with Holm-Bonferroni correction. The reaction times between errors and
correct responses were compared for the Leans-opposite and No-leans conditions
separately, using independent-samples t-tests, while correcting for two
comparisons using Holm-Bonferroni.
Furthermore, training effects were tested by performing a binary logistic
regression, with the sequence of conditions (A and B; see Figure 3) as predictor,
and occurrence of an error (true or false) as dependent measure. The run
characteristics were compared between each pair of conditions with paired-
samples t-tests without correction to check for differences.
3. Results
3.1 Performance examples
Figure 4 (top) shows an example of an RRE in the Leans-opposite condition. At t =
-4 s, the pilot induced a motion cue by rolling the aircraft from a 20 to a 10° bank
angle with a maximum roll rate of about 13°/s. Removal of the blindfold occurred
at t = 0. After removing the blindfold, the participant responded by rolling into the
opposite direction, i.e., away from level, for about 2 s, before correcting the input
towards the correct direction.
Figure 4 (bottom) shows a different example of an RRE in the Leans-
opposite condition. A video recording of this event can be found in the
supplementary files in Appendix A. In this case, the participant made two extra
RREs at t = 2.5 and 4 s, before rolling to level flight. The confusion in this example
lasted for a total of almost five s. However, the first input briefly stopped at around
t = 1.8 s, meaning that the measured error duration was only 0.8 s.
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Figure 4. Two examples of roll reversal errors in the Leans-opposite condition. The
plotted data represents the low-pass filtered (integrated) IMU data.
3.2 Outcomes
The mean (and standard deviation) of performance outcomes and run
characteristics are presented in Table 2. For four participants, the video data were
lost. For one participant, this was the case for the Leans-opposite and Leans-level
condition only. This resulted in missing cases for the error duration, the reaction
times and the blindfolding duration. Participants in the video recordings always
looked at the AI instead of outside when removing the blindfold. One participant
was excluded from the analysis due to prematurely removing the blindfold in a
mismatching condition, which gave the participant insight into the maneuvers
flown. A new participant was recruited instead.
Table 2. The means and standard deviations (SD) of performance variables and the
run characteristics.
Matching No-leans Leans-opposite Leans-level
Mean (SD) N Mean (SD) N Mean (SD) N Mean (SD) N
Error rate (%) 5.0 (19.0) 40 23.0 (N/A) 40 58.0 (N/A) 40 63.0 (N/A) 40
Error
duration (s)
.70 (.11) 2 .88 (.63) 8 .91 (.76) 19 .76 (.52) 24
Reaction time
correct (s)




.40 (.21) 2 .65 (.22) 8 .39 (.34) 19 .38 (.42) 25
Blindfolding
duration (s)
27.0 (3.0) 36 31.2 (8.0) 36 34.7 (6.6) 35 33.4 (5.1) 35
Fast roll cue
duration (s)
2.1 (.38) 40 N/A N/A 1.5 (.32) 40 2.0 (.33) 40
3.2.1 Error rate
The error rates are also graphically shown in Figure 5. There was a significant
main effect of Condition on error rate,Q (2,38) = 14.25, p = .001. Significantlymore
(2.7 times as many) RREs were made in the Leans-opposite condition than in the
No-leans condition, p = .001. There were also significantly more errors in the
Leans-level condition than in the No-leans condition, p = .002. In contrast to our
hypothesis, however, there was no significant difference between the Leans-
opposite and Leans-level condition, p = .832. All erroneous responses in the Leans-
Level condition were towards the opposite site of the fast roll cue.
Figure 5. The mean error rates in the Matching condition (practice) and in the
three test conditions.
3.2.2 Error duration
Scatterplots of the error durations are shown in Figure 6. There was a significant
effect, F(2,2) = 25.27, p = .038. Post-hoc analyses revealed that errors lasted
significantly longer in the Leans-opposite condition than in the No-leans
condition, t(1,5) = 3.19, Δ = .53 s, p = .024.
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Figure 6. Scatterplots of the error durations.
3.2.3 Reaction time
Scatterplots of the reaction times are shown in Figure 7. There was no difference
between erroneous and correct responses in the No-leans condition, t(1,35) = .57,
p = .574, but there was in the Leans-opposite condition, t(1,33) = 2.78, p = .009. In
this condition, the reaction times of errors were .28 s shorter than those of the
correct responses.
When comparing the reaction time of correct responses between the
conditions (No-leans and Leans-opposite), there was no significant difference,
t(1,14) = .16, p = .879.
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Figure 7. Scatterplots of the reaction times of the correct responses and incorrect
responses.
3.2.4 Learning effect
The sequence of the conditions significantly predictedwhether an error wasmade
in the Leans-level condition only, B = 2.14, p = .006. Participants were
approximately twice as likely tomake an error if the Leans-level conditionwas the
first condition, compared to the last. There were no significant effects of the
sequence of the conditions on error duration.
3.2.5 Run similarity check
Participants were blindfolded for a significantly longer time in the Leans-opposite
condition than in the No-leans condition, t(1,34) = 2.47, p = .019,  = 3.4 s. This
difference is small compared to the average blindfolding time (i.e., ca. 30 s). The
duration of the fast roll cue was significantly longer in the Leans-level condition
than in the Leans-opposite condition, t(1,39) = 7.37, p < .001,  = .51 s.
3.2.6 Subjective variables
Two missing cases resulted from forgetting to question the participant. Four out
of the remaining eighteen questioned participants (22 %) indicated that they
perceived a bank angle at the end of the blindfold phase during the No-leans
condition. This perceived bank angle was in the direction of the actual bank angle
in two cases, and into the opposite direction in two other cases.
4. Discussion
The results showed that misleading motion cues of the aircraft bank angle had a
strong influence on the participants’ control inputs. Both conditions involving
leans cues (Leans-level and Leans-opposite) showed error rates of about 60 %,
that is, 2.7 times higher than in the No-leans condition (23%). The RRE rate in the
No-leans condition was similar to those found in previous in-flight experiments
with non-pilots (21.9-23.6 %; Roscoe & Williges, 1975; Ince, Williges & Roscoe,
1975). Thus, the current results indicate that the likelihood of making an RRE
greatly increases when one has a false sensation of the bank angle.
We expected the highest RRE rate in the Leans-opposite condition, as this
condition presents the possibility of making interpretation errors (i.e., horizon
control reversals). However, contrary to our hypothesis, the RRE rates were not
significantly higher in the Leans-opposite condition than in the Leans-level
condition. Thus, there was no evidence of misinterpretations, and the errors in
both leans conditions could instead have been caused by participants responding
too quickly and neglecting the AI. Indeed, reaction times of incorrect responses in
the Leans-opposite condition were faster than correct responses. Compared to a
similar (level) condition in a previous fixed-base study by Landman et al. (2018),
the error rate in the in-flight Leans-level condition was much higher (63 %
compared to 30 %). This suggests that motion cues had a stronger influence on
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the responses than amanipulation of the expectation with a fixed-base flying task.
There was also no significant difference between the conditions in error duration
and reaction time of correct responses. Thus, these supplementary measures
besides RREs showed no additional evidence that participants hadmore difficulty
in responding to the AI or in correcting incorrect responses when leans cues were
present.
Caution should be taken when extrapolating our findings from non-pilots
to pilots. Pilots are likely less susceptible to misleading motion cues and
misinterpretations of the AI due to their flying experience and knowledge.
However, previous in-flight experiments found that pilots are not impervious to
issues with reading the AI, as they made RREs at rates of 1.5-3.1% (Beringer,
Williges, Roscoe, 1975; Hasbrook & Rasmussen, 1973). The outcomes of the
current study hint that also pilots may produce higher error rates when they are
spatially disoriented or suffering from surprise.
Another issue to take into account in the interpretation of the results, is the
variation in the manually flown maneuvers. The fast roll cue in the Leans-level
condition lasted longer than in the Leans-opposite condition due to
standardization of the start of this cue (i.e., 20° bank). Based on verbal reports by
the participants, it seems that there were sometimes inadvertent leans sensations
present in the No-leans condition. Some participants indicated that they were
surprised by the bank angle in the No-leans condition, which may have affected
their response. Finally, the current experiment focused on responses during static
bank angles, while it has been argued that interpretational issues areworse during
roll motions (Roscoe, 1968).
For future experiments on this topic, the following lessons were learned
with regard to the methodology. First, it may be wise to include at least one run
with level flight in the practice runs, to prevent that participants presume that
they always need to give an input. Second, although test flights indicated that the
outside view wasn’t noticeable when focusing on the AI, the information
presented to participants could be more tightly controlled by covering the side
window or by using training glasses that prevent outside vision (i.e. ‘foggles’).
5. Conclusions
The results of this study show that misleading motion cues induce incorrect
expectations, which in turn cause RREs. The comparison between different leans
conditions indicated that this effect could be attributed to participants responding
too quickly based on their assumption of the bank angle, while neglecting the AI.
Although the study was performed with non-pilots, the outcomes suggest
several aspects are likely important to consider when training pilots or
performing research on pilot control. The found effect of leans cues on expectation
and control behavior underlines the importance of accurate motion cues for both
training and research. Second, the effectiveness of a display system may be
strongly diminished when the controller has mismatching expectations. It would
therefore be wise to test, for instance, upset recovery display aides (e.g., Ewbank,
Mumaw & Snow, 2016) when mismatching expectations are present. The results
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